Intro

What is the question E.D. is trying to answer?
 

• Durkheim notices that the fact of a division of labor is universal across societies.  He wants to know why.  And, given that as society progresses the division of labor also increases, should we attempt to resist this trend or embrace it? (from the intro, not assigned reading).

 
• E.D. makes the following hypothesis:  the division of labor serves to create social solidarity.

 "...the economic services that it can render are insignificant compared with the moral effect that it produces, and its true function is to create between two or more people a feeling of solidarity." (p.17)

Thus, the research question is the degree to which different ways of dividing labor (social functions) serves to integrate society.

"...above all we must determine the degree to which the solidarity it produces contributes generally to the integration of society.  Only then shall we learn to what extent it is necessary, whether it is an essential factor in social cohesion, or whether, on the contrary, it is only an ancillary and secondary condition for it.  To answer this question we must therefore compare the social bond to others, in order to measure what share in the total effect must be attributed to it.  To do this it is indispensable to begin by classifying the different species of solidarity." [p.129]

“...social solidarity is a wholly moral phenomenon which by itself is not amenable to exact observation and especially not to measurement.” (p.24)

ED does not give us a clear, one sentence def. of 'solidarity'.  HE does say,
    [Solidarity] attracts men strongly to one another, ensures frequent contacts between them, and multiples the opportunities available to enter into mutual relationships." {129}

    He spends a fair amount of time defending this claim against three alternatives:

1. That law is an incomplete indicator [true, but captures the essence]
2. That we should study it directly [would be nice, but (a) no data and (b) we must measure it by its outcomes - just as we use change in volume to measure change in temperature]
3. That it's really a psychological problem, whether people like their country, etc. or not. [Not of interest to ED]

"Thus our method is clearly traced out for us.  Since law reproduces the main forms of social solidarity, we have only to classify the different types of laws in order to be able to investigate which types of social solidarity correspond to them.”

The argument is sketched as:

 

E.D. says that the best way to classify laws is on the types of punishment that follows from the law [p132]..  He identifies two types:

1. (1) An injury/fine imposed on the perpetrator. These are called repressive laws.
2. (2) Those that restore thing to the way they were before the crime was committed, called restitutory laws.

Mechanical Solidarity (Chapter II of the Division of Labor)

    It is definitional that the type of social solidarity associated with repressive laws are those that correspond to crimes resulting in repressive punishments.

What, then, is a crime?

• By definition, crimes are acts repressed by punishments.

What, he asks, is universal about crime?

There are multiple possibilities:

• One theory says acts that hurt society are repressed, and thus crimes are simply acts that hurt society.
• E.D. rejects this because too many acts that are considered crime in no way hurt the society. (p.32,33), and that the same act which is criminal in one setting is not in another.  If, in fact, they were detrimental to society, criminal acts should be more general in their content.
•     Well, let's modify the same idea some: Acts which seem harmful to the society are considered criminal.  Since we can never know if an act is really harmful, then we repress the things that seem harmful.
• Again, E.D. says no. Taking this argument would result in a truism: societies deem as 'necessary' the things they deem necessary. (See p.33)  It does not explain WHY they view them as needed.
• The only feature common to all crimes across all societies is that they comprise acts universally condemned by the members of that society.

“The only feature common to all crimes is that, saving some apparent exceptions to be examined later, they comprise acts universally condemned by the members of each society. … The real nature of the fact we have just established cannot be disputed, [namely], that crime disturbs those feelings that in any one type of society are to be found in every healthy consciousness.” (p.33 and 34)

“Since the rules are inscribed upon everyone's consciousness, all are aware of them and feel they are founded upon right.”
“Undoubtedly if an act is punished, it is because it is contrary to a mandatory rule, but this rule is not expressly spelt out.  There can be only one reason for this:  it is because the rule is known and accepted by everybody.” (p.35)

Given that crimes offend people ‘universally’, how do we characterize that stuff we all know? E.D. says:

     "The totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average members of a society forms a determinate system with a life of its own.  It can be termed the collective or common consciousness." (p.39) [132]
 
• The common consciousness is independent of the particular conditions in which individual find themselves. (it outlasts them).
• The common consciousness is “something totally different from the consciousness of individuals, although it is realized in individuals.” (p.39)

 “…an act is criminal when it offends the strong, well-defined states of the collective consciousness.” (p.39)

"we should not say that an act offends the common consciousness because it is criminal, but that it is criminal because it offend that consciousness." (p.42) [133]

What might this common cause be?

• The serious nature of the interest that the state directs?
• Not Likely, the harm alone is rarely weighty enough to elicit severe punishment. (p.42).
• Instead, “the problem is easily solved when we perceive that wherever an authority with power to govern is established its first and foremost function is to ensure respect for beliefs, tradition and collective practices – namely to defend the common consciousness from all its enemies, from within as well as without.” (p.42)

     "The scope of the action that governmental authority exerts over the number of criminal acts, and the designation of what is criminal, depend upon the power it [government] possesses.  This power in turn may be measured ether by [1] the degree of authority that it exercises over its citizens or by [2] the degree of seriousness attributed to the crimes directed against it." (p.43)

Thus, Durkheim argues, crime is always defined in terms of the collective consciousness.

To sum up:  Section I. is about defining crime -- what it is and what it means.  Crime must be defined in terms of an offense to the common consciousness -- either directly, by violating those things everyone finds important, or indirectly by violating the authority of the common consciousness representative in the authority figure.
 

II. Punishment.

Given that crimes  are affronts to the common consciousness, what is punishment?

• In the first place, punishment is an emotional reaction.

“This characteristic is all the more apparent the less cultured societies are.  Indeed, primitive peoples punish for the sake of punishing, causing the guilty person to suffer solely for the sake of suffering and without expecting any advantage for themselves from the suffering they inflict upon him.” (p.44)

But this passion (evidenced by the excesses of punishment -- against both husband and family, etc.) is moderated in modern societies -- where punishment is really just a deterrent to the 'evilly inclined'.

“It is claimed that we do not make the guilty person suffer for the sake of suffering.  It is nevertheless true that we deem it fair that he should suffer.” (p.46)

"[The practice] adapts itself to the new conditions of existence created for it, without thus undergoing any essential changes.  This is what happened in the case of punishment." (p.45)

But where does punishment come from? the INDIVIDUAL or from SOCIETY?
 

• A theory that starts with the vendetta would say that the individual is the source of the passionate vengeance expressed through punishment.  But this runs counter to the facts, which show that most crimes, and certainly most seriously punished crimes came from religion, & E.D. equates offenses to religion as offenses to society itself.

• They are mixed. being part repressive and part restoring.

What distinguishes legal repression from the 'diffused repression' that follows acts that are merely immoral (we rarely throw people in jail for lying or cheating at cards, for example)?

• Legal repression is organized.

 E.D. says that organization consists in submitting criminal activity to a collective body for judgment.  That is, to the development of a criminal court. “The only organization met with everywhere that punishment proper existed is thus reduced to the establishment of a court of law.” (p.52)

With this, we get a final definition of punishment:

     "Punishment constitutes essentially a reaction of passionate feeling, graduated in intensity, which society exerts through the mediation of an organized body over those of its members who have violated certain rules of conduct." (p.52).

What separates repressive law from civil law - law that simply restores previous order?

First, recall that crimes are those things that affect the common consciousness:  Thus,

“…since the sentiments that crime offends within a single society are the most universally collective ones of all, since they represent especially powerful states of the common consciousness, they cannot possibly brook any opposition. …. we need a more violent form of satisfaction.” (p.55)

"when we demand the repression of crime it is not because we are seeking a personal vengeance, but rather vengeance for something sacred which we vaguely feel is more or less outside and above us." (p.56)

     "Crime therefore draws honest consciousnesses together, concentrating them.”

He provides an example.  In a small town, everyone talks about the criminal scandal.  Just like when horrible things happen in the news, we respond.  By discussing the crime and punishment with people we know, we reinforce our opinion about the immorality of the action.

     "In short, since it is the common consciousness that is wounded, it must also be this that resists; consequently, resistance must be collective."

But why this resistance is organized remains to be explained.

Historically, crimes were judged by the WHOLE people, then as society progressed, certain samples of people and judges took the place of the whole. (bottom of p.59)  - the organization into courts is a division of labor response:  the world got bigger, and needed more people to split up the work of policing the common consciousness.  (Note, of course, that this is exactly the moment that greater individual variation in what, exactly, people have in common starts to magnify).

     "Thus, it is certainly the nature of the collective sentiments that accounts for punishment, and consequently for crime."

IV.  Conclusion.

Now E. D. ties the argument back to social solidarity.  He does this in the first paragraph:

          "Thus our analysis of punishment has substantiated our definition of crime.  We began by establishing inductively that crime consisted essentially in an act contrary to strong, well-defined states of the common consciousness. WE have just seen that in effect all the characteristic of punishment derive from the nature of   crime.  Thus the RULES SANCTIONED BY PUNISHMENT ARE THE EXPRESSION OF THE MOST ESSENTIAL SOCIAL SIMILARITIES." (p.60) [p.134]

“Two consciousnesses exist within us: the one comprises only states that are personal to each one of us, characteristic of us as individuals, whilst the other comprises states that are common to the whole of society.”  (p.61)

“This gives rise to a solidarity … which deriving from resemblances, binds the individual directly to society.”  We call this mechanical solidarity.

 "...we all know that a social cohesion exists whose cause can be traced to certain conformity of each individual consciousness to a common type, which is none other than the psychological type of society. [don't worry about that term, it's a relic of E.D.'s time of writing]. "  - i.e. when people think alike, they tend to congregate ' to exhibit cohesion.

It is this solidarity, called MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY, that repressive laws represent.  The effect of these laws is to maintain the social cohesion that arises from these similarities.

“[Punishments] real function is to maintain inviolate the cohesion of society by sustaining the common consciousness in all its vigor.” (p.63).

Without punishment, we – as a collective – would not be able to see the borders of acceptable behavior.  Each punishment tells us what types of things are allowed and not allowed.  Thus, punishment has the result of reinforcing what we already know. Without punishment, the boundaries of acceptable behavior blur, and the depth of the common consciousness weakens.  Thus, E. D. says:

"Punishment is, above all, intended to have its effect upon honest people."

because it helps to describe the moral boundaries of the societies people live in.

Thus, E. D. makes a long argument linking types of crime to a specific type of social solidarity.  Here’s a summary: (PDF file).
(here is is again (Power Point file)).

Mechanical Solidarity rests on similarity.  Thus, if other social facts generate difference among members of the society, then mechanical solidarity will decrease, and the common collective consciousness will decrease as well.  We will see in the next reading, that historical growth leads to a decrease in Mech. Sol.
 

Organic Solidarity Notes (Chapter 2 of DOL)

Recall the overall argument:

• Durkheim (E.D) wants to know: Is the division of labor good for social solidarity?
• However, it is impossible to measure social solidarity directly
• Thus we need some indicator of the types of solidarity in a society.
• E.D. Uses LAW as his indicator of social solidarity
• To make this strategy work, he must identify classes of law.  If he can identify classes of law, then he can trace them back to types of societies.
• E.D. argues that to classify law, we look at what happens when the law is broken: what kind of punishment is exercised.
• Using this distinction, E.D. Identifies two types of law:
• Criminal or Penal law
• Restitutory or 'civil' law (broadly construed)
• The solidarity that corresponds with criminal law is mechanical solidarity: solidarity that rests on sameness
• In the section, E.D. identifies the types of solidarity that follow from restitutory law

    "The distinguishing mark of this sanction is that it is not expiatory, but comes down to a mere restoration of the 'status quo ante'." (p.68)[p136]

    "Damages awarded have no penal character: they are simply a means of putting back the clock so as to restore the past, so far as possible, to its normal state." (p.69)

• Restitutory laws put the world back together -- they restore what was before.
• Restitutory laws are not (usually) part of the collective common consciousness.  Instead, they apply to very specific areas (corporate law, accounting law, housing law, contract law, etc.) and, E.D. claims, a violation of such a law does not elicit the emotional need for expiation that a criminal offense does.

 

 
 
 

"The idea that murder can be tolerates sets us up in arms, but we very readily accept that the law of inheritance might be modified, ....Since these prescriptions do not correspond to any feeling within us, an as generally we don no know their scientific justification, since this science does not yet exist, they have no deep roots in most of us." [137]
 

• Since restitutory laws do not affect everyone, the solidarity that restitutory laws relate to cannot rest on a uniform similarity across everyone in the group.

    E.D. wants to relate a type of law to a type of solidarity.  To do this, he needs a system for describing types of laws.  Within restitutory law, he identifies two types:

1. Negative Laws
2. Positive Laws

Negative Laws

Laws that link people to things, but not people to people directly.

'Real' (called real by jurists) and concern the relational of people to things. ("real" here the same root as 'real-estate')

 

 
 
 

"We can thus see what this 'real' form of solidarity consists of: it links things directly to persons, but not persons to one another. ... Consequently, since it is only through the mediation of persons that things are integrated into society, the solidarity that arises from this integration is wholly negative." (p.72-73)
 

At the extreme example -- if we were to imaging a world based only on negative solidarity, what would it look like?  E.D. says:

"Let us envisage such agreement to be as complete as possible; the society where it obtains, if it does so alone, will resemble a huge constellation in which each star moves in its orbit without disturbing the motion of neighboring stars.  Such a solidarity thus does not shape from the elements drawn together an entity capable of acting in unison.  It contributes nothing to the unity of the body social." (p.73)

• Do you believe E.D's claim that the laws don't push  people toward common thoughts?
• What about the inheritance example?  Could inheritance build solidarity?  Must it? Why or why not?

 
• E.D. defines a second kind of negative law: those that are between persons: (second type of
       negative law).  These are used to govern how to apply real rights.
               (i.e. what to do when your neighbor builds an addition to a common fence).

       [it's not clear to me, frankly, that this isn't another type of positive law......]

• Read the summary on p.75 carefully if you want to understand this distinction

What is E.D.'s distinction between 'Justice' and 'Charity' that he makes on p.77?

• Positive Laws:
• Positive laws connect people to each other directly, and thus can be a way of uniting the body social, and they spring essentially from the division of labor.
• We can see this clearly in domestic law which defines the duties and roles of each person in the family.
• Laws that say WHAT can happen (i.e. must be 16 and no closer than 2nd cousin to be married),
• Laws that say what the NORMAL type of FUNCTION should be: I.e. the roles of father, husband, wife, legitimate heir, etc. (most readily seen in divorce, the courts then need to keep the FUNCTION (i.e. child support) even when the actual marriage is  gone)

• Positive law is at its clearest (for E.D.'s purpose) when relating to CONTRACTS.
• There are two ways to divide labor:
• Simple: many of us do the same thing, and then combine all those similar pieces together.  This requires no interdependence
• Composite: Where a task is divided into qualitatively different things.  "This latter form of co-operation is moreover the one that the contract by far the most usually expresses." (p.79)
• In general, a contract is a symbol of exchange that links one person and what they do to another person and what they do.  Thus, the division of labor is held together by a set of interdependencies.  The carpenter needs farmers to eat, the farmer needs a carpenter to build the barn.  In developed societies, these chains of interdependence can weave through an entire society, linking together the various functions of the body social. The contract (and thus positive law) solidifies these connections.  "In the end [positive law] plays a part analogous in society to that of the nervous system in the organism." (p.83).
• Sum up: Page 81 -82, read carefully for exam.

E.D. says that our analysis of law shows two kinds of positive solidarity:

• Mechanical Solidarity
• links the individual to society directly
• "a more or less organized society composed of beliefs and sentiments common to all the members of the group." (p.83)
• This is a collective type of solidarity.
• can only be strong in cases where ideas common to all people outweigh ideas common to individuals (p.84).
• "this society can only increase in inverse relationship to the personality." (p.84)
• "The solidarity that derives from similarities is at its maximum when the collective consciousness completely envelops our total consciousness, coinciding with it at every point.  At that moment our individuality is zero."(p.84)
• "In societies where this solidarity is highly developed the individual,...,does not belong to himself; he is literally a thing at the disposal of society." (think of the Borg example from Star Trek.  Keep this in mind when you read Totalitarianism by Arendt.)
• Organic Solidarity
•  links the individual to society through the sub-parts of society
• "a system of different and special functions united by definite relationships."
• Assumes that people are different from each other.
• "[Organic solidarity] is only possible if each one of us has a sphere of action that is peculiarly our won, and consequently a personality." (p.85)
• "This solidarity resembles that observed in the higher animals.  In fact each organ has its own special characteristics and autonomy, yet the greater the unity of the organism, the more marked the individualization of the parts." (p.85)

       Example: Two types of networks: one of hunters and  gatherers, another with modern industrial sectors.

       I<----------------------------------------------->I
       Mech.                                                        Organic
 

       The division of labor is understood to characterize changes in social solidarity. (i..e a progression from mechanical to organic).

       E.D. claims that as individuality goes up, the social whole 'develops' more and increases solidarity.  Does  this hold entirely?  Do we need SOME common overlap? How much?  I.e. how close to the poles above could we get?

There's a nice summary of the argument in the book.  It's worth a rough quote:

"The following propositions sum up this first part of our work.
    Social life is derived from a dual source, the similarity of individual concsiousnesses and the social division of labor.  In the first case the individual is socialized because, lacking any individuality of his own, he is mixed up with his fellows in the same collective type. In the second case [i.e. organic] it is because, whilst his physiognomy and his activities are personal to him, distinguishing him from others, he depends upon them to the very extent that he is distinguished from them, and consequently upon the society that is the result of their combining together.
    The similarity of consciousnesses gives rise to legal rules which, under the threat of repressive measures, impose upon everybody uniform beliefs and practices. The more pronounced the similarity, the more completely social life is mixed up with religious life, an the closer economic institutions are to communism.
    The division of labor gives rise to legal rules that determine the nature and relationships of the function thus divided up, but the infringement of the rules entails only measure of reparation lacking any expiatory character." (p.173)

The Causes
Having described the general trend and the link between DOL and solidarity, ED turns to explaining where the DOL comes from.  WHY do we find the DOL everywhere?  HE starts by limiting his topic:

    "What are the causes of the division of labour?
    Undoubtedly there can be no question of finding one single formula to account for all the possible forms of the division of labour. Such a formula does not exist.  Each particular case depends upon special causes that can only be determined by a special linvestigation.  THe problem that we are posing is less wide.  IF we leave out of account the various forms that the division of labor assumes according to the conditions of time and space, the general fact remains that the division of labor develops regularly as history proceeds. This fact certainly depends on causes that are likewise constant, causes that we shall investigate." (p.179)

Note that he discusses a 'segmentary' society. This is the social organization that goes with mechanical solidarity -- isolated, local groups that are all-encompassing.

Key to the rise of a DOL is a decrease in this segmentary society.
 

    "THe increase in the DOL is therefore due to the fact that the social segments lose their individuality, that the partitions dividing them become more permeable.  IN short, there occurs between them a coalescence that renders the social substance free to enter upon new combinations." {p.141}

"Thus the division of labor progresses the more individuals there are who are sufficiently in contact with one another to be able mutually to act and react upon one another.  IF we agree to call dynamic or moral density this drawing together and the active exchange that results from it, we can sat that the progress of the division of labor is in direct proportion to the moral or dynamic density of society." {p.141}

He ends up relying on 2 causes of the DOL. Primarily he relies on the increase in Dynamic Density, secondarily on the increase in VOLUME.

Its important to point out, that he sees this as a fundamental cause, that works through a particular mechanism (namely darwinian competition, which we will get to below).

Increases in dynamic density come through three primary developments:

1. Population concentration - the move from randomly dispersed hunters/gatheres to agricultural based, geographically concentrated social organization
2. The transformational and development of towns, which includes an increase in the social needs evident for the population.

 

 
 
 

"But towns always result from the need that drives individuals to keep constantly in the closest possible contact with one another.  THey are like so many points where the social mass is contracting more strongly than elsewhere. They cannot therefore multiply and spread out unless the moral density increases. Morevover, we shall see that towns recruit their numbers through migration to them, which is only possible to the extent that the fusion of social segments is far advanced." {142}
 

3. The speed and means of communication and transmission.

This process is a cyclic one, once started. So it looks something like:

                    Concentration ----------->  Division of Labor -----------> Concentration ------|
                                                                            |                                                                |
                                                                            |________________________________|

Secondly, the increase in simple VOLUME of people matters, though only when there is also an increase in density.

Thus,

    "The division of labor varies in direct proportion to the volume and density of societies and if it progresses in a continuos manner over the course of social development it is because societies become regularly more dense and generally more voluminous" {144}

    "It is beyond question that the external conditions in which individuals live leave their mark upon them and that, since these conditions are diverse, they cause this differentiation." (p.206)

OK, so we have a general argument about how dynamic density increases DOL. But WHY does this happen?  He sets up an ultimate cause in concentration and dynamic density, but really we want a mechanism.  The mechanism he provides is one of Darwinian Competition.  That as concentration increases, people have to diversify to survive, else they are competing for the same resources.
 

1. "If labour becomes increasingly divided as societies become more voluminous and concentrated, it is not because the external circumstance are more varied, it is because the struggle for existence becomes more strenuous" (p.208)
2. After reviewing Darwinian selection, he says that "Men are subject to the same law.  In the same town different occupations can coexist without being forced into a position where they harm one another, for they are pursuing different objectives." (209-210)
3. "This having been said, it is easy to understand that any concentration in the social mass, particularly if accompanied by a growth in population, necessarily determines the progress of the division of labor"
4. "The division of labor is therefore one result of the struggle for existence: but it is a gentle denouement.  Thanks to it, rivals are not obliged to eliminate one another completely, but can coexist side by side.  Moreover, as it develops, it provides a greater number of individuals, who in more homogeneous societies would be condemned to extinction, with the means of sustaining themselves and surviving." (p.213)

The Abnormal Forms of the Division of Labor
The Anomic Division of Labor
    Thus far, ED has made it sounds as if there is no problem associated w. DOL. All is good, and purely functional.  He does, however, recognize that there are many problems with the DOL, but his claim is that these are not systemic with the division of labor, but a result of "abnormal forms" problems with the implementation if you will, of the DOL.

He starts (in stuff you did not read) laying out the problem w. three examples which he considered to be "general" exemplars of the types of problems that we commonly see:

1. Industrial failure:  a rise in bankruptcy.  "A first case of this nature is provided for us by industrial or commercial crises, and by the bankruptcies that are so many partial breaks in organic solidarity.  They demonstrate in fact that at certain points of the organism certain social functions are not adjusted to one another." (p.292)
2. Class conflict. "Hostility between labour and capital is another example, a more striking one, of the same phenomenon.  As industrial functions specialise more the struggle becomes more fierce, fare from solidarity increasing. [he then gives a nice thumbnail of the history of relations, starting w. serfs and ending w. free labor]
3. The ever-widening gulf in science, that no one can understand it all, and thus that science is not progressing as a whole. "Up to very recent times, science, not being very much divided, could be studied almost in its entirety by one and the same person. ... But as specialization was introduced into scientific work each scientist shut himself off increasingly, not only within a particular science, but within a particular kind of problem"  Quoting Schaeffle, he says that "this division of intellectual labor gives serious grounds for fearing that this return to ... the ruination of all science" (p293-4)

How do we deal with this? Comte suggested using government to solidify the different pieces. But ED says this can't work, because the world simply becomes too complex (making an argument that is very similar to those put against state economies about inefficiency.  Instead, ED argues, government is like the brain/nervous system.  While it SEEMS to control everything, in fact, it evolved at the same time as the rest of the organism, and is really the encoding of traditional/common practices.

If we can identify the causes of the abnormal forms, we can correct them.  So what are the causes?

"If in certain cases organic solidarity is not all the at is needful, it is certainly not because mechanical solidarity has lost ground, but because the conditions of existence for [organic solidarity] have not been realised."  That is, if we get a DOL too soon, we have a problem.  But what are these conditions?

Solidarity requires a regulatory apparatus that sits behind and ensures contracts (i.e. government, norms, tradition).  These can only develop slowly.  "The role of competition is not to abolish competition but to moderate it." (p.145)  These regulatory features develop slowly, as a chain from "ways of reacting" to "habit" to "obligation" (p.145)

He then walks through these three abnormal forms (bankruptcy, class conflict, science dispersion), to show how they are determined by the lack of development in a slow, progressive way.

 
"Now in all the cases we have described above, this regulatory process either does not exists or is not related to the degree of development of the division of labor." (p.146)

"THese various examples are therefore varieties of a same species.  In all these cases, if the division of labor does not produces solidarity it is because the relationships between the organs are not regulated; it is because they are in a state of anomie." (p.147)

Where does this anomie come from?  Anomie is impossible when organs are solidly linked together and are in sufficient contact for a sufficient amount of time.  But if "some blocking mechanism" makes contact impossible, then this regulation cannot develop.

The "coincidence of exceptional circumstances" make regulation impossible, namely (a) to wide a span and (b) to fast a development.
 

He makes a specific point about the role of DOL in alienation:

 
"THe foregoing removes all grounds for one of the gravest reproaches that have been made against the DOL.
    It has often been accused of diminishing the individual by reducing him to the role of a machine. ANd indeed, if he is not awry of the operations required of him are leading, if he does not link them to any aim, he can no longer perform them save  out of routine. Every day her repeats the same movements with monotonous regularity, but without having any interest or understanding o of them em. He is no longer the living cell of a living organism, moved continually by contact w. neighboring cells, which acts upon them and responds in turn to their action, ....  He is no more than a l s cog, which an external force sets in motion.  ... What resolves this contradiction is the fact that, contrary to what has been said, the DOL does not produce this consequences though some imperative of its own nature, but only in exceptional and abnormal circumstances." (p.306-307)

Another reason for class conflict is that it follows when DOL is 'forced' instead of arising spontaneously.  "we may therefor state that the division of labor only produces solidarity if it is spontaneous, and to the degree that it is spontaneous.  But spontaneity must mean not simply the absences of any deliberate, formal type of violence, but of anything that may hamper, even indirectly, the free unfolding of the social force each individual contains within himself." p.312-313.